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Abstract
This dissertation aims to understand the the general recovery process of real GDP
from banking crises from the perspective of permanent and transitory components of
output.
In chapter 1, we investigate the general long-term effects of systemic banking crises
on real GDP using a sample of a number of economies over 1960-2012. Our
methodology is to estimate the response of the level of real GDP to a banking crisis
by decomposing it into permanent and transitory components using the statistical
framework of the Unobserved Components (UC) model (Harvey 1985 and 1989, Clark
1987). Our main empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, we reconfirm
that the negative impact of banking crises on output is generally persistent. Second,
and more importantly, advanced economies tend to be more adversely affected in
magnitude of an output loss, but experience a stronger rebound from recessions.
Third, an output loss in countries with well-developed financial markets is largely
transitory, while for countries with less developed financial markets, the loss reflects
mainly the permanent component.
In chapter 2, we investigate the effect of expansionary monetary policy on the
recovery process of real GDP in response to a banking crisis using the empirical
framework of the UC model. Our sample includes three major economies: US, Japan,
and UK. We find that expansionary monetary policy can play an important role in
the process of economic recovery. A positive shock of an increase in the money supply
reduces more than 50 percent of the transitory losses during the first 4 quarters for
the US and Japan, while the impact from monetary policy in the UK is very limited.
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1 Estimating Permanent and Transitory
Components of Economic Recovery
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis originated in the US in 2007 set off a wave of systemic
banking crises in many developed economies. Since the onset of the crisis, the pace of
economic recovery of the US and other developed economies has been unusually
sluggish from the perspective of recent history in terms of many macroeconomic
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment growth.
This rather surprising outcome forces policy makers and the public to face more
general questions about economic recovery from banking crises. Is it normal for
recessions associated with banking crises to be particularly long? What is the long
impact of the crises on the economy? Will part of an output loss from these
recessions be permanent or can the loss be regained eventually?
Figure 1 shows the movements of real GDP for six countries (Finland, Sweden,
Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) before and after major banking crises.1 A
casual look at the past international experiences provides an impression of a long and
sustained impact of crises on real GDP. All countries who experienced a sizable
output contraction following banking crises rebounded after one to two years.
However, the longer-term dynamics of output level vary across countries. For
example, one group of countries (Finland and Sweden) experiences a rebound of
output to the trend line. The other group (Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, and
Malaysia) has more sluggish post-crisis movement. A negative deviation from the
trend is so persistent that it does not return to the trend over the post-crisis 10-year
1Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) call the crises in two Nordic countries and Japan “Big Crises.” Thai-
land, Indonesia, and Malaysia experienced the Asian financial crisis in which simultaneous crises in
banking and currency occurred.
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Figure 1: Real GDP before and after Banking Crises
Notes:
1. Each pair of panels for each country displays real GDP with a trend line (upper panel) and a
percentage deviation of the actual level of output from the trend (lower panel) over the period before
and after each country’s major banking crisis (10 years before and after the onset of a crisis). The
shaded area shows a starting year of the crisis.
2. The trend line (dashed line in the upper panel of each pair) is calculated by fitting a linear
regression through the real GDP series during a 10 year pre-crisis period plus a 5 year post-crisis
period starting on the third year from the onset of the crisis.
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period. For Malaysia, the output loss even increases over the period. A question
arises: what are the general patterns of recessions associated with banking crises and
subsequent recoveries from the recessions?
Reviewing large archives of financial crises (including banking, currency, and
sovereign debt crises) over the past eight centuries, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a,
2009b) find that a slow recovery from a banking crisis is common across countries and
over time. Although each crisis episode has different initial background conditions,
recessions associated with banking crises tend to be severe and protracted. Cerra and
Saxena (2008) analyze the general response pattern of post-crisis GDP using a simple
time series model on a large sample of economies, and find that the conventional
notion of economic recovery might be illusory in case of banking crises. They argue
that the crisis lowers actual GDP relative to its pre-crisis path and that this
persistent impact on output holds across countries.2
If a banking crisis produces particularly long and deep recessions, and hence is
particularly detrimental to economic growth, how should we respond? What types of
policies may help reduce the losses? What is the relationship between the level of a
country’s financial integration and the impacts of banking crises on the economy? A
chance of having another banking crisis might increase as financial markets develop.
Will a recession induced by such a crisis be even longer and deeper with more
developed markets? Is there any chance that the potential cost outweighs the benefits
from development of financial markets? These issues are particularly important in
recent years since the public opinions about the role of financial markets are divided.
One group prefers free and less controlled financial markets, while another group
prefers a strong regulation and control of financial markets. Our paper presents some
insights to address these issues.
2Studies on economic recovery are also performed by IMF (2009), Haugh et al. (2009), Howard
et al.(2011), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012), Furceri and Mourougane (2012), and Cerra and Saxena
(2012).
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In this chapter, we add two new angles to the existing empirical investigation of
economic recovery. First, we decompose real GDP into the permanent and transitory
components and analyze the economic recovery process through dynamic interactions
of two components in response to a banking crisis. This provides an empirical base
for a structural interpretation of economic recovery. Second, we attempt to capture
differential patterns of such interactions of two components as the economy expands
its financial markets. Since the degree of development of financial markets is roughly
proportional to the size of the economy, we extend the dynamical analysis of the
recovery process into four income groups of countries.
Our main empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, we reconfirm that the
negative impact of banking crises on output is generally persistent as existing
literature predicts. Second, and more importantly, advanced economies tend to be
more adversely affected in magnitude of an output loss, but have a stronger rebound
from the recessions. Third, an output loss in countries with well-developed financial
markets is largely transitory, while for countries with less developed financial
markets, the loss reflects mainly the permanent component.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 presents an empirical
framework and characterization of economic recovery. The empirical results are given
in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 gives some concluding remarks.
1.2 Empirical Framework
1.2.1 Model
The simplest model to analyze economic recovery from a crisis is to express the
output behavior as an autoregressive integrated process of order p, or ARIMA (p, 1,
0) with a drift term shifting at the incident of a banking crisis. More specifically, we
4
consider the model






γkdt−k + ut, (1)
where ∆yt is the log difference of output and dt indicates a 0-1 variable reflecting the
start year of the crisis. The γk’s capture the lagged impact of the crisis on the drift
term α. The crisis is thought to be an event exogenous to the output process. This
simple model can successfully describe the impact of the crisis and the economy’s
recovery from it, as Cerra and Saxena (2008) have shown.3 Strictly speaking, the
event of a banking crisis can never be an exogenous incident, but the model captures
a rough picture over numerous crises across countries.4 In fact, their empirical results
are found very interesting as we see in later sections.
What lacks in Cerra and Saxena (2008) is, however, that it does not distinguish a
permanent and a transitory movement of the output process during the course of
economic recovery, and it fails to find the dynamic interaction of the two components.
Actually, the impact of a banking crisis on the economy tend to be permanent in
their model by design.
To address the above issue, we consider a model in which the output process is
expressed as a sum of two orthogonal component processes, one purely permanent
3Cerra and Saxena (2008) use an autoregressive GDP growth model for panel data as follows:







where i=1,2,...N denotes an index number of sample countries.
4Teulings and Zubanov (2014) test the assumption that an incident of a banking crisis is exogenous
to real GDP. They run a logit regression of the banking crisis dummy on lagged GDP levels. They
find that lagged GDP level have no predictive power for the likelihood of a banking crisis for annual
data.
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and the other purely transitory. More specifically, the model is given by
yt = τt + ct, (2)
where τt and ct are a permanent and a transitory component of output, respectively.
These two components follow their respective dynamics as
τt = µ+ τt−1 +
p∑
j=0




δjdt−j + εt, (4)
where dt = 1 if a crisis occurs at t and zero otherwise. ηt and εt are uncorrelated i.i.d.
processes with zero mean and variances σ2η and σ
2
ε . Except for the inclusion of the
crisis dummy variables, the model (2)-(4) is a standard version of the Unobserved
Components (UC) model, frequently used in empirical business cycle studies (Harvey
(1985, 1989), Clark (1987)). We assume φ(z) = 1− φz with |φ| < 1. Component τt
may be interpreted as a “trend” of the output process, and Eq. (3) implies that it is a
random walk with drift equal to µτt = µ+
p∑
j=0
θjdt−j, where θj stands for the lagged
impact of the crisis on the drift term. Component ct is a “cycle” part of the output
process, which is assumed to be stationary. Eq. (4) implies that the mean of ct is
equal to µct =
q∑
j=0
φjδjdt−j, where δj stands for the lagged impact of the crisis on the
mean of the cycle term. Suppose now that there is a banking crisis starting at time
T . Then, the h-period-ahead predicted trend (the permanent component) at T − 1 is
given by




for h = 1, 2, ..., where τ t = (τt, τt−1, ...). Therefore, the shift of the trend
6
attributable to the crisis converges to a constant equal to
p∑
j=0
θj after the horizon h
exceeds p. On the other hand, the h-period-ahead predicted cycle (the transitory
component) at T-1 can be shown as




where ct = (ct, ct−1, ...). Note that this component dies out eventually.
In terms of the first difference, expressions (5) and (6) imply
E(∆τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(h = j), (7)
and




φh−j−1δj + δh1(h− 1 < q), (8)
where 1(A) is equal to 1 if A is true and is zero otherwise.5 Finally, by combining
expressions (5)-(6) and (7)-(8), the respective h-period-ahead predictions of the level
and the growth rate of output are expressed as
E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1) = E(τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1) + E(cT+h|cT−1, dT = 1), (9)
E(∆yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1) = E(∆τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1)+E(∆cT+h|cT−1, dT = 1).
(10)
5The mathematical proofs of expressions (5)-(8) are given in Appendix A
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Expressions (5) and (6) show the capability of our model to capture the differential
impacts of the crisis of the two components on the output process, which can reveal
many interesting aspects of economic recovery. For example, if the sum of θj is found
negative, it means that the output trend line has shifted down permanently due to
the crisis. The net effect of a crisis on each component cannot be captured by the
simple AR model which treats all impacts as permanent.
1.2.2 Types of Economic Recovery
Economic recovery is one of the most confusing concepts. Economists generally refer
to the term “economic recovery” as the process starting from the bottom of a
recession through restoration of a certain pre-crisis condition. However, there appears
to be little consensus on exactly what feature of the economy consists of such a
pre-crisis condition. There are at least three distinct types of economic recovery from
a crisis, depending on the condition under which the economy is said to have
recovered.
The first type of recovery simply concerns the timing when the level of output returns
to the pre-crisis level. We call this type of recovery the “level recovery.” The second
type of recovery is related to the timing when the output growth rate reaches the
pre-crisis level. We call this type the “growth recovery.” The third type of recovery
concerns the timing when output bounces back to the trajectory that would have
prevailed if there had not been a crisis. In other words, output rises enough to
compensate the early loss and comes back to the pre-crisis trajectory as if no crisis
had taken place. We call this type the “trend recovery.”6
We now consider implications of our UC model (2)-(4) on the three types of recovery
6Becker and Mauro (2006) define recovery as the first type. IMF (2009) follows the concept of
“growth recovery.” The “trend recovery” is employed in a number of studies (Cerra and Saxena
(2008), IMF (2009), Haugh et al.(2009), Wynne (2011), Laeven and Valencia (2012)), each of which
uses a different method to estimate the trend.
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mentioned above. The first type of recovery, the level recovery, requires a return of
output to the pre-crisis level yT−1, or
LRh ≡ E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1)− yT−1 ≥ 0.
Since







it is easy to see that the requirement of the level recovery is the least stringent among
the three types of economic recovery. As long as we have a positive linear trend µ,
the economy would always reach the level recovery after the finite periods following
the crisis.
Since the growth recovery at T + h implies
E(∆yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1) ≥ E(∆yT |τT−1, cT−1, dT = 0) = µ − (1 − φ)cT−1,
it requires







φh−j−1δj + δh1(h < q + 1) ≥ 0,
for h = 1, 2, 3, .... We assume that the growth rate declines at the moment of a
crisis, which implies GR0 = θ0 + δ0 < 0. Whether we have a growth recovery at
h = 1, for example, depends on (1− φ)2cT−1 + θ1 − (1− φ)δ0 + δ1 > 0, and whether
we have at h = 2 depends on (1− φ)(1− φ2)cT−1 + θ2 − (1− φ)(φδ0 + δ1) + δ2 > 0
and so on. Since E(cT−1) = 0, we will on average have GRh → 0 as h→∞, or will
9
eventually have a growth recovery even under the worst scenario.
Lastly, the third type of recovery, the trend recovery, requires that output gets back
to the level along the trajectory expected before the crisis, or more specifically
E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1) ≥ E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dt = 0).
From expression (9), we find











θj as h→∞, the trend recovery is ultimately determined by the
non-negativeness of the sum of θj’s. It appears that not many banking crises
recoveries can satisfy this condition. In the empirical analysis to follow, we examine
the results from the standpoint of the all three types of economic recovery. Figure 2
illustrates these three types of economic recovery.
1.2.3 Data
Our data set covers 80 countries with 99 episodes of systemic banking crises over the
period 1960-2012.7 Data on banking crisis dates are taken from Leaven and Valencia
(2012). All crisis episodes are considered to be severe enough to have a major
macroeconomic impact. We employ the World Development Indicators (WDI) as a
source of annual real GDP in constant 2000 US dollars. We classify our samples into
four country groups of (i) high income, (ii) upper middle income, (iii) lower middle
income, and (iv) low income countries, as done by Cerra and Saxena (2008), to
7The list of countries is given in Appendix C.
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examine the possibility of a differential impact in banking system across income
levels. The classification of income group of countries is also based on WDI.8
8WDI divides economies into four groups according to 2012 GNI per capita. The groups are: low
income, $1,035 or less; lower middle income, $1,036 - $4,085; upper middle income, $4,086 - $12,615;











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our main focus lies in depicting the movement of output from its outset through its
recovery for a typical banking crisis, globally as well as for a certain group of
countries. The net effect of a typical crisis on output is found as the predicted
differentials between the output trajectory with a crisis and without a crisis after its
incident. More specifically, it can be expressed as
zτh ≡ E(τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1)− E(τT+h|τT−1, dT = 0), (11)
for the permanent component and as
zch ≡ E(cT+h|cT−1, dT = 1)− E(cT+h|cT−1, dT = 0), (12)
for the transitory component at horizon h. Combining the two expressions above, we
obtain
zh ≡ zτh + zτh = E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 1)− E(yT+h|τT−1, cT−1, dT = 0), (13)
as the effect on the after-crisis output trajectory attributable to a banking crisis. The
above approach is an extended version of the classical intervention analysis dated
back to Box and Tiao (1975), and the effect on output can be calculated in a similar
way to the conventional impulse response function although it is a response to an
incident of a crisis rather than an impulse or shock. Roughly speaking, we distinguish
two types of influence of a crisis on the output process. The one is a temporary shift
in slope of the time path and the other is a temporary deviation from this path.
Tables 1a and 1b summarize the h-period-ahead net effects of a banking crisis on the
13
Table 1: Effects of a Banking Crisis on Permanent and Transitory
Components
(a) The effect on the permanent component
Horizon (h) Net effect on level Net effect on growth
0 θ0 θ0
1 θ0 + θ1 θ1
2 θ0 + θ1 + θ2 θ2
3 θ0 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3 θ3
4 θ0 + . . .+ θ4 θ4
≥ 5 θ0 + . . .+ θ4 0
(b) The effect on the transitory component
Horizon (h) Net effect on level Net effect on growth
0 δ0 δ0
1 φδ0 + δ1 −(1− φ)δ0 + δ1
2 φ2δ0 + φδ1 + δ2 −(1− φ)(φδ0 + δ1) + δ2
3 φ3δ0 + φ
2δ1 + φδ2 + δ3 −(1− φ)(φ2δ0 + φδ1 + δ2) + δ3
4 φ4δ0 + φ
3δ1 + φ
2δ2 + φδ3 + δ4 −(1− φ)(φ3δ0 + φ2δ1 + φδ2 + δ3) + δ4





1. Table (a) and (b) summarize the h-period-ahead net effect of a banking crisis on the permanent
and transitory components, respectively under the assumption of p = q = 4.
2. The second column of each panel reports the effect on the level of each component. The third
column reports the effect on the growth rate of each component.
permanent and transitory components, respectively.9
In the next section, we start analyzing the four different dynamic responses to a
banking crisis on the entire sample of countries. Then, we provide analysis on the
sub-samples of four different income groups. To obtain the common pattern of output
response, we calculate the mean of the parameters estimated separately for each
country (Table 2).10 Our UC model is estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
9In this chapter, we estimate our UC model with 4 lags of a banking crisis dummy (that is,
p = q = 4). We do not observe significant coefficients in higher lags of a crisis dummy.
10We also calculate the mean of the responses generated from each country’s estimated parameters.
This methodology does not produce any large quantitative/qualitative difference from we report in
this paper.
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(MCMC) technique with 10,000 iterations and 2,000 burn-in draws.11 We report the
dynamic responses with one-standard-error bands to assess the statistical significance
of the estimation results.
1.3.1 Global Picture
Panels of Figure 3 show the dynamic responses of the permanent component (Panel
(a)), the transitory component (Panel (b)), and overall output (Panels (d) and (e)) at
a time horizon from -1 to 10. Our results reconfirm the permanent impact of banking
crises on output as existing literature suggest, but more importantly, they show that
there exists a significant difference in the shape of the permanent and transitory
components.
The permanent component exhibits an “L-shaped” response. The loss falls by about
0.5 percent initially and continuously decreases until the 4th year from the onset of
the initial shock. In the subsequent years, the response stays at about -2 percent.
The permanent impact of the crisis leads output to never recover from a banking
crisis in the sense of the trend recovery and shifts down the future path of of real
GDP permanently.
The transitory response exhibits a “V-shaped” response. More specifically, the
transitory component experiences its initial loss of 0.4 percent and then reaches its
trough of 0.8 percent after 1 year. From then on, the output loss starts to shrink
quickly. After 6 years, the transitory response returns to zero. Panel (c) reports the
shares of the permanent and transitory components at a 10-year horizon. The initial
shock is almost equally shared by the two components. As time goes on, the
contribution of the permanent component monotonically increases.
Finally, we combine the two effects to compare our results with those from the simple
11See Appendix B for the state space representation of our empirical model and computational
procedures.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates: UC Model with Banking Crisis Dummies
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
All countries High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low
Income Income Income Income
θ0 -0.400 -0.217 -0.612 -0.308 -0.400
(0.098) (0.173) (0.150) (0.178) (0.098)
θ1 -0.486 -0.388 -0.689 -0.431 -0.486
(0.098) (0.184) (0.146) (0.178) (0.098)
θ2 -0.377 -0.325 -0.486 -0.346 -0.377
(0.094) (0.179) (0.117) (0.174) (0.09)
θ3 -0.320 -0.269 -0.318 -0.326 -0.320
(0.088) (0.178) (0.11) (0.176) (0.088)
θ4 -0.303 -0.291 -0.308 -0.260 -0.303
(0.086) (0.183) (0.107) (0.162) (0.086)
µ 5.00 4.294 5.588 5.223 4.72
(0.388) (0.685) (0.916) (0.731) (0.68)
δ0 -0.458 -0.731 -0.821 -0.126 -0.276
(0.067) (0.140) (0.139) (0.127) (0.127)
δ1 -0.691 -1.197 -1.030 -0.424 -0.169
(0.069) (0.151) (0.142) (0.132) (0.130)
δ2 -0.451 -1.012 -0.611 -0.231 -0.031
(0.067) (0.146) (0.133) (0.132) (0.128)
δ3 -0.336 -0.647 -0.319 -0.178 -0.257
(0.065) (0.141) (0.127) (0.130) (0.127)
δ4 -0.333 -0.687 -0.260 -0.150 -0.305
(0.066) (0.146) (0.127) (0.129) (0.127)
φ 0.231 0.210 0.236 0.233 0.241
(0.013) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
σ2ε 33.51 26.30 39.29 32.96 33.89
(6.572) (12.65) (15.09) (12.079) (11.80)
σ2η 3.851 2.00 4.27 3.884 4.934
(0.590) (0.552) (1.660) (0.905) (1.052)
Notes:
1. The table reports the averaged estimates of parameters of Eqs. (3) to (4) and the standard errors
of the average estimates for each income group.
2. We estimate the model for each country and then calculate an average of each parameter across
the sample countries in the same income group. The averaged standard errors are reported in
parenthesis.
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AR model. Panel (d) and (e) show the responses of overall output estimated from our
UC model and the simple AR model.12 13 The significant difference between the two
models is the existence of the output rebound. In the UC model, the output loss is 1
percent at the incident of a shock and continues to accumulate for 4 years to reach
2.3 percent at the bottom of recession. In the 5th year after the crisis, output gains
for the first time, that is, the economy recovers in the sense of growth recovery. This
rebound is, however, partial and the response stays around at 2 percent loss beyond
the 6th year. In contrast, the response from the simple AR model never exhibits any
rebound from its deepest loss; in other words, it never closes the gap between actual
output and the pre-crisis output trajectory which would be realized if there had been
no banking crisis.14
12Note that, in the UC model, the dynamic response of overall output (real GDP) is the sum of the
permanent and transitory responses.
13We estimate ARIMA(4,1,0) model as done by Cerra and Saxena (2008).
14Cai and Denhaan (2009) find that the simple AR model is likely to predict that the impact of the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.3.2 Country Group Analysis
Now, we analyze the dynamic responses across different income levels of economies.
Panels of Figure 4 show the dynamic responses of the two components (Rows (a) and
(b)), the contribution of each component (Row (c)), and the overall output responses
estimated from the UC model and the simple AR model (Rows (d) and (e)) for each
income group. Two distinctive features between the permanent and transitory
responses stand out from the income-group-wise comparison.
First, in the permanent component, we find that the size of a loss tends to be with in
a similar level except the group of upper middle income countries. The group of
middle income counties experiences the largest output loss, which accounts for 2.5
percent 4 years after. The smallest loss (1.5 percent) is experienced by the group of
high income countries.
In contrast, the size of a transitory loss is rather in proportion to a country’s income
level. The group of high income countries suffers the most severe loss of around 1.4
percent one year after the shock. The magnitude of the deepest loss proportionally
decreases as a country’s income level goes down. Lower middle and lower income
countries experience only 0.4 percent losses at the bottom. The relative importance
of the transitory component also declines as the income level lowers. In particular,
around 75 percent of the initial shock in high income countries is driven by the
transitory component. However, the transitory shock accounts for only 30 percent on
impact of a crisis in the low income group.15
Panels in Row (d) in Figure 4 present the overall output response for each income
group estimated by the UC model. While the persistent loss is common for all income
groups (that is, there is no trend recovery), we find that all income groups recover in
the sense of growth recovery along with an output rebound. In particular, the output
15Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) find that the primary source of fluctuations in developing countries
are highly volatile permanent shocks rather than the transitory shocks.
19
Figure 4: Responses by Income Levels
Notes:
1. The panels in Rows (a), (b), and (d) for each income group report the responses of the permanent
component, the transitory component, and the overall output, respectively. The dashed lines denote
plus/minus one SE confidence intervals.
2. The panels in Row (c) report what percent of the output loss is attributed to trend and cycle
(vertical axis) at a 10-year time horizon from the onset of a crisis shock.
3. The panels in Row (e) for each country report the response of output estimated by the simple AR
model.
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rebound is strongest in the groups of high income countries in which more than 20
percent of the output loss at the trough is recuperated in subsequent years while the
rebounds are insignificant in less developed countries.
This feature is not shared by the simple AR model (Panels in Row (e)), which tends
to treat a shock as a permanent shock. Three income groups except the group of
higher middle income countries do not exhibit any output rebounds from the
recessions. In particular, high income countries experience a continuous fall in output.
The results from our UC model may be interpreted as a transition from an
elementary stage of financial development to a more advanced stage of development.
At a very elementary level of financial development, an economy with undeveloped
financial markets is not likely to suffer a nation-wide market crisis. The lack of the
economy-wide banking system does not allow an impact of a local bank failure to
spread over the entire economy holding down the size of the impact of banking crises.
However, at the same time, developing countries lack in a strength of macroeconomic
fundamentals as a shock absorber. Even if the shock is small, it may have a sustained
and long-lasting impact on the economy.
As a bank finance penetrates into the economy and grows in scale, the economy
becomes correspondingly more vulnerable to an adverse shock to any local part of the
system. However, further development of financial systems may help limit the large
banking-crisis shock to a temporary shock. When a scale expansion of banking
network is followed by a widening of the channels of financial arrangements beyond
bank loans (such as corporate bonds or equity finances), the negative impact of
banking crises, even when spread over the whole economy, would be more likely to be
absorbed by other channels before paralysing the entire economy.16
16Adler and Tovar (2012) find a country’s strength of macroeconomic fundamentals as well as a




In this section, using the Unobserved Components model with a banking-crisis
dummy, we quantify the general effects of systemic banking crises on real GDP and
its two components, the permanent component and the transitory component, over
the past five decades across a wide range of economies. In addition to reconfirming
the persistent impact of banking crises as existing studies suggest, we find that more
advanced economies tend to be more adversely affected in terms of the magnitude of
the output loss, but experience a larger rebound of the output from recessions. This
result is attributable to the different contribution of the permanent component and
the transitory component to the overall output loss across different income levels of
economies. The output loss in higher income countries is explained by the transitory
component rather than the permanent component. Meanwhile, in less developed
countries, the majority of the loss reflects the permanent component, leading to no
bounce-back.
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2 Estimating the Effects of Monetary Policy on
Recovery
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, using an annual data set of real GDP for a number of countries, we
analyze the general dynamic response of real GDP to banking crises in terms of the
permanent and transitory components, and we find interesting patterns of the
recovery process across different income groups of economies. In this chapter, shifting
our focus to each country’s response, we investigate the effect of monetary policy on
economic recovery from banking crises.
While knowledge on how to conduct monetary policy during a banking crisis exists,
few studies focus on how such policy affects the dynamics of output in the aftermath
of crises.17 If there were no monetary policy actions to the crisis, what losses would
the economy have experienced? Does monetary policy help reduce the losses?
We add an exogenous monetary policy variable into the framework of our UC model
to investigate the effect of expansionary monetary policy on the post-crisis dynamics
of real GDP. Estimating the dynamic output response from a monetary policy shock,
we show a counter-factual path of output if there was no policy reaction. To capture
the short-run dynamics, we employ quarterly data for 3 major economies: US, Japan,
and UK.
Our primary finding is that monetary policy (an increase in the money supply) is
important in influencing the recovery process. Nearly 50 percent of the transitory
losses are reduced after the onset of the crisis for the US and Japan while the UK
experiences a very limited impact from monetary policy.
17One exception is Furceri and Zedzienicka (2012). They analyze the role of structural and fis-
cal/monetary policy variables and find that monetary policy limits the negative effect of banking
crises in the medium term using a local projection method in generating impulse response functions




We modify our UC model with a banking crisis dummy as follows:
yt = τt + ct (14)
τt = µ+ τt−1 +
p∑
j=0










where xt is a scalar variable to measure a monetary policy shock. We assume that
monetary policy has no real effect in the long run, and thus allow xt to impact only
the transitory component. This model is assumed to capture the potential differential
impact of monetary policy on output during the course of recovery from the crisis. γ0
captures the lagged impact of monetary policy on the transitory component in
normal times and γ1 measures its impact during the post-crisis period.
18 As we
discuss in the later section, the monetary policy shock is estimated from a simple
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model.19
18We set γi(L) =
∑4
k=1 γikL
k since we do not have any significant coefficients in the higher lags.
19Lo and Piger (2005) apply the similar empirical approach. They treat dt as a Markov regime-
switching variable representing the period of expansions and contractions to capture asymmetric
impact of monetary policy during recessions.
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2.2.2 Measurement of Monetary Policy Shock
For the monetary policy variable xt, we construct a money-based monetary policy
shock from a VAR.20 The VAR contains Money (M1), Income (real GDP),
Unemployment rates, Prices (the GDP deflator), Wages (hourly earnings) and Import
prices. The recursive VAR in the above order is estimated, and we refer to a residual
in the money equation as a “monetary policy shock” in the sense that it is a
component of money which is not predicted from the past information of the six
variables. To capture the short-term impact of monetary policies on real economic
activity, we employ quarterly data over the period from the first quarter of 1960 to
the fourth quarter of 2012. Real GDP, monetary aggregate, hourly earnings, and
unemployment rates are taken from a database of OECD Stats. The other variables
are from the International Financial Statistics managed by the International
Monetary Fund. We transform all of the variables except the unemployment rate into
the natural logarithm.
2.3 Empirical Results
Our interest is centered on the role of monetary policy in influencing the process of
economic recovery from banking crises. As in chapter 1, we compute the dynamic
responses of the transitory component and overall output to the banking crisis shock.
In addition, we generate a response of the transitory component to a monetary policy
shock by simulating a positive unitary shock to the money supply (M1). Table 3
presents the parameter estimates of Eq. (16). Panels of each country in Figure 5 show
the responses of the transitory component and overall output, respectively, at a time
horizon from -1 to 12 (quarters). The dotted lines in the panels represent the
counter-factual path of the dynamic output responses if there was no monetary policy
20We use the model specification of Sims (1980)’s 6-variable VAR. The number of lags are determined
by Akaike Information Criteria. We use 4 lags for US and UK and 2 lags for Japan.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates: UC Model with a Monetary Policy Shock
Parameter US Japan UK
γ01 0.02 0.18 -0.017
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
γ02 0.037 -0.017 0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
γ03 -0.01 -0.05 0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
γ04 -0.06 -0.20 0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
γ11 0.45 0.21 0.058
(0.50) (0.50) (0.54)
γ12 0.37 0.27 0.12
(0.51) (0.52) (0.54)
γ13 0.57 0.57 0.20
(0.51) (0.52) (0.55)
γ14 1.04 0.48 0.27
(0.49) (0.52) (0.55)
Note:
The table reports the parameter estimates of Eq. (16) and the standard errors of the estimates for
each country.
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shock. Our results suggest that monetary policy effectively reduces the output loss
from the banking crises although the degree of the policy impact varies across the
countries. For the Untied States, the simulated response of the transitory component
starts at -0.4 percent and reaches its trough of -2.3 percent 5 quarters after the onset
of a crisis. Our results show that the output loss would be much larger if there was
no monetary policy reaction. The initial transitory loss would become 0.9 percent,
which is almost twice as large as the expected loss with monetary policy. A monetary
policy shock in Japan also attenuates the negative impact of a banking crisis. At the
4th quarter, almost 70 percent of the transitory loss is reduced by the monetary
policy reaction. Meanwhile, for the United Kingdom, the conduct of monetary policy
has a limited impact on output.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of monetary policy under the framework of
the UC model with a banking crisis dummy variable. We find that a positive shock of
the money supply significantly reduces the loss in the transitory component of real
GDP. More than 50 percent of the transitory losses are reduced during the first 4
quarters after the onset of the crisis for US and Japan. In contrast, UK experiences a































































































































































Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs
In this section, we prove expressions (7) and (8) by mathematical induction from
expressions (5) and (6). All of the expressions are given as:
E(τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1) = τT−1 + (h+ 1)µ+
min(h,p)∑
j=0
θj for h = 1, 2, ..., (5)




E(∆τT+h|τT−1, dT = 1) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(h = j), (7)




φh−j−1δj + δh1(h− 1 < q). (8)
For expression (5), let ΩT = (τ
T−1, dT = 1). By definition, the expected value of the
h-period-prediction of ∆τ given ΩT is expressed as
E(∆τT+h|ΩT ) = E(τT+h − τT+h−1|ΩT )
= E(τT+h|ΩT )− E(τT+h−1|ΩT ). (A.1)
For h = 1, the 1-period-ahead prediction of ∆τT is
E(∆τT+1|ΩT ) = E(τT+1|ΩT )− E(τT |ΩT ). (A.2)
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Using expression (5), this becomes
E(∆τT+1|ΩT ) =

µ for p < 1,
µ+ θ1 for 1 ≤ p.
Therefore, we satisfy
E(∆τT+1|ΩT ) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(1 = j). (A.3)
Now, suppose some arbitrary integer k which satisfies (A.3), that is,
E(∆τT+k|ΩT ) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(k = j). (A.4)
We consider the (k + 1)-period-ahead prediction of ∆τT as follows:
E(∆τT+(k+1)|ΩT ) = E(τT+(k+1)|ΩT )− E(τT+k|ΩT )
= E(τT+(k+1)|ΩT )− E(τT+(k−1)|ΩT )− E(∆τT+k|ΩT ). (A.5)
If (A.4) is true, then (A.5) becomes
E(∆τT+(k+1)|ΩT ) =

µ for p < k + 1,
µ+ θk+1 for k + 1 ≤ p,
or
E(∆τT+k+1|ΩT ) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(k + 1 = j). (A.6)
Therefore, by mathematical induction from (A.3) and (A.4)-(A.6), we prove
E(∆τT+h|ΩT ) = µ+
p∑
j=0
θj1(h = j) for h = 1, 2, 3, 4, .... (A.7)
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Next, we prove expression (8) in the same manner. By definition, we have
E(∆cT+h|ΨT ) = E(cT+h − cT+h−1|ΨT ) = E(cT+h|ΨT ) − E(cT+h−1|ΨT ), (A.8)
where ΨT = (c
T−1, dT = 1).
For h = 1, (A.8) becomes
E(∆cT+1|ΨT ) = E(cT+1|ΨT )− E(cT |ΨT ). (A.9)
Using expression (6), this is equal to








For any q, the following expression holds:




φ−jδj + δ11(0 < q). (A.11)
Now, we consider h is some arbitrary integer k and suppose E(∆cT+k) satisfies
expression (8), that is,




φk−j−1δj + δk1(k − 1 < q). (A.12)
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Consider E(∆cT+(k+1)) as
E(∆cT+(k+1)|ΨT ) = E(cT+(k+1)|ΨT )− E(cT+k|ΨT )
= E(cT+(k+1)|ΨT )− E(cT+(k−1)|ΨT )− E(∆cT+k|ΨT ). (A.13)
If (A.12) is true, then (A.13) is equal to
E(∆cT+(k+1)|ΨT ) = −φk+1(1−φ)cT−1− (1−φ)
min(k,q)∑
j=0
φk−jδj +δk+11(k < q). (A.14)
Finally, by mathematical induction from (A.10) and (A.11)-(A.14), we prove




φh−j−1δj + δh1(h− 1 < q) for h = 1, 2, 3, .... (A.15)
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Appendix B: State-Space Representation of the UC
Model and Sampling Procedure







































Once a dynamic system of the model is written in a state-space form, the Kalman
filter computes the optimal estimates of the unobserved state vector [τt ct]
′,
conditional on the parameters and the information set of Ψt−1. We apply a Bayesian
estimation method, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to estimate our empirical
model, in which the parameters and the state variables are treated as random
variables. We follow the sampling algorithm in Kim and Nelson (1999). We assume
the standard setting of conjugate priors for the unknown parameters. In particular,
we specify an Inverse-Gamma prior distribution for the standard errors and a Normal
prior distribution for the other coefficients. The initial values of the parameters are
obtained from the linear estimation on the HP filtered trend and cycle. We define the
vectors of the state variables and hyperparameters as
θ = {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, µ}




Then, Gibbs Sampling algorithm is described as follows:
1. Initialize θ, δ, φ, τ, c, ση, σε;
2. Sample τ |θ, ση, σε, y;
3. Sample c|δ, φ, σε, y;
4. Sample θ|τ, ση, y;
5. Sample ση|θ, τ, y;
6. Sample φ|δ, c, σε, y;
7. Sample δ|φ, c, σε, y;
8. Sample σε|δ, φ, c, y.
Finally, we set up the following prior distributions for the hyperparameters:
σ2η ∼ IG(1, 1000);
σ2ε ∼ IG(1, 100);
θ ∼ N(0, 100× I6);
δ ∼ N(0, 100× I5);
φ ∼ N(0, 100).
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Appendix C: Banking Crises Episodes
High Income Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Income
Income Income
Austria 2008 Algeria 1990 Albania 1994 Burundi 1994
Belgium 2008 Argentina 1981 Bolivia 1986 Benin 1988
Denmark 2008 Argentina 1989 Bolivia 1994 Burkina Faso 1990
Finland 1991 Argentina 2001 Cape Verde 1993 Bangladesh 1987
Germany 2008 Azerbaijan 1995 Cameroon 1987 Central Africa 1976
Ireland 2008 Bulgaria 1996 Cameroon 1995 Central Africa 1995
Israel 1997 Belarus 1995 Congo Rep 1992 Chad 1983
Italy 2008 Brazil 1994 Egypt 1980 Chad 1992
Japan 1997 Chile 1976 El Salvador 1989 Congo, DR 1983
Netherlands 2008 Chile 1981 Ghana 1982 Congo, DR 1991
Norway 1991 Colombia 1982 Georgia 1991 Congo, DR 1994
Portugal 2008 Colombia 1998 India 1993 Kenya 1985
Slovakia 1998 Dominican Rep 2003 Indonesia 1997 Kenya 1992
Spain 1977 Ecuador 1981 Morocco 1980 Kyrgyzstan 1995
Spain 2008 Ecuador 1998 Nigeria 1991 Liberia 1991
Sweden 1991 Hungary 1991 Nigeria 2009 Madagascar 1988
United Kingdom 2007 Jordan 1989 Nicaragua 1990 Mali 1987
United States 2007 Macedonia 1993 Nicaragua 2000 Mozambique 1987
Mexico 1994 Philippines 1983 Mauritania 1984
Malaysia 1997 Paraguay 1995 Niger 1983
Panama 1988 Senegal 1988 Nepal 1988
Peru 1983 Ukraine 1998 Sierra Leone 1990
Romania 1990 Ukraine 2008 Togo 1993
Russia 1998 Vietnam 1997 Uganda 1994
Thailand 1983 Yemen 1996 Zimbabwe 1995
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